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THE DUE PROCESS CONUNDRUM: USING
MATHEWS V. ELDRIDGE AS A STANDARD
FOR PRIVATE HOSPITALS UNDER THE
HEALTH CARE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT
AMY L. MOORE*
I. THE HEALTH CARE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT
Medical malpractice litigation had exploded in the United States by
the mid-1980s.1 This increase in malpractice suits was partially caused by a
shift in public opinion—what once was an unconditional trust of doctors
shifted to a more searching inquiry into the motivations and behaviors of
health care professionals.2 As the number of cases increased over time, so
too did the amounts awarded by juries in terms of damages, averaging in
excess of $100,000, and often exceeding $1 million.3 Patients who had
been wronged by their physicians also became more willing to file suit
because of these increased jury awards. These jury awards were often
crippling to private hospitals, which in turn would take responsive or
sometimes preemptive action against these suits by terminating their
*
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to Landon Breazeale for his research assistance and help during this project.
1. 132 CONG. REC. 17,247 (1986) (statement of Sen. Al Gore) (“Medical malpractice
poses a serious threat to America’s health care system. . . . The malpractice crisis has
escalated throughout this past decade.”); Manion v. Evans, 986 F.2d 1036, 1037 (6th Cir.
1993) (“The early 1980s witnessed a new trend in health care litigation as states and health
care accrediting bodies stepped up their promotion of peer review . . . . As this process
gathered force, physicians aggrieved by the results of peer review increasingly appeared in
federal court . . . .”).
2. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Hearings on H.R. 5540 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.
37 (1986) [hereinafter Subcomm. Hearings] (statement of Richard Kusserow, Inspector
General, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs.); 132 CONG. REC. 17,247 (1986); Subcomm.
Hearings at 135 (statement of Dr. William Mixon, former president, American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists) (“The ACOG acknowledges that there is a problem of a
lack of public confidence in the mechanisms employed to protect the public from poor
practitioners.”); Medical Practice: Hearings on H.R. 5110 Before the Subcomm. on Health
and the Env’t of the H. Comm. of Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 1 (1986) (statement of
Rep. Henry Waxman, Chairman, Subcomm. on Health and the Env’t) (“Both doctors and
their patients complain that their relationship is increasingly adversarial.”).
3. 132 CONG. REC. 17,247 (1986) (statement of Sen. Al Gore).
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relationship with the offending physician.4 However, contemporaneous
studies showed that for every 242 times a patient was killed or injured as a
result of doctor negligence, only one serious internal disciplinary action
was taken against the doctor.5 Thus even as external action in the form of
litigation was increasing, internal action was stagnant or nonexistent as
hospitals seemed to refuse to punish doctors for incompetent behavior.
During this time period only a few hospitals began to take proactive
steps to stem the tide of litigation, revoking a doctor’s privileges to practice
at a hospital if the doctor was incompetent or unprofessional.6 The process
used by hospitals to revoke a physician’s privileges usually included a peer
review process comprised of other doctors from the same hospital.7
However, the doctor whose privileges had been revoked could in turn sue
the hospital for numerous state law violations such as breach of contract or
defamation.8 This backlash litigation against the hospital meant that peer
review and removal of offending doctors did not protect it from litigation as
the hospital had initially theorized that it would.9
Aside from strategic use of litigation, some doctors under
investigation by state boards would voluntarily surrender their licenses in
one state before a formal hearing could take place so that they could
continue to practice medicine in a different state where they maintained a
license.10 This tactic would become part of a plea bargain where hospital
boards could avoid costly due process hearings and physicians could
continue to practice medicine.11 In essence, the hospital would agree to
take no action against the physician if he or she would simply leave town
and practice incompetent medicine somewhere else. Sometimes these deals
4. Id. (“Meanwhile the skyrocketing cost of malpractice insurance has led many
doctors to quit the business, and made health care more expensive for everybody.”); H.R.
REP. NO. 99-903, pt. 1, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6385 (“One [problem] is
that hospitals too often accept “voluntary” resignations of incompetent doctors in return for
the hospital’s silence about the reasons for the resignations. Hospitals make these
agreements in order to avoid lengthy and unpredictable litigation. The other is that there is
no comprehensive national reporting system to follow bad doctors from place to place.”).
5. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 54 (statement of Dr. Sidney Wolfe, Director,
Public Citizen Health Research Group).
6. H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, at 2 (“Unfortunately, groups such as state licensing boards,
hospitals and medical societies that should be weeding out incompetent or unprofessional
doctors often do not do so. Even when such bodies do act against bad physicians, these
physicians find it easy to move to different hospitals or states and continue their practices in
these new locations.”).
7. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 96 (statement of David H. Weinstein et al.).
8. 132 CONG. REC. 17,247 (1986) (statement of Sen. Al Gore) (“[D]octors and health
care personnel will never be able to police their own ranks until Federal laws are changed to
protect peer review. Under current law, a doctor who testifies against a colleague can be
sued for slander or restraint of trade.”).
9. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 50 (testimony of Hon. Thomas J. Tauke).
10. Id. at 34 (statement of Richard Kusserow, Inspector General, Dep’t of Health and
Human Servs.).
11. Id.
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would even include carrying good references from the hospital in exchange
for leaving town and not suing the hospital.12 The threat of being sued thus
had an obvious chilling effect on the reporting of incompetence.13 Even in
cases where payments were made to patients, part of the settlement
agreement would sometimes include a promise not to report the information
about the doctor to the state licensing board.14
Other doctors are considered the “first line of defense” against
malpractice because they observe it happening around them.15 However,
reporting or whistleblowing about another doctor’s incompetence, without
any protection, can discourage doctors from coming forward with these
claims to even start the peer review process.16 This meant that some
hospitals simply did not engage sufficiently in peer review.17
A. The History of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act
In order to protect hospitals that did engage in peer review from
any backlash litigation from unhappy physicians, state legislatures had
begun to pass provisions to provide legal immunity for these hospitals.18
12. Id. at 48 (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman, Chairman, Subcomm. on Health and
the Env’t).
13. Id. at 44 (statement of Richard Kusserow, Inspector General, Dep’t of Health and
Human Servs.).
14. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 55 (statement of Dr. Sidney Wolfe, Director,
Public Citizen Health Research Group) (“Based on data from the American Medical
Association, we have estimated that in 1984 patients were awarded damages 16,400 times in
medical malpractice cases, usually by out-of-court settlements. In a large proportion of
cases, part of the settlement agreement involves a promise not to report the information
about the doctor to the State Licensing Board.”).
15. Id. at 52 (statement of Rep. Ron Wyden).
16. 132 CONG. REC. 17,247 (1986) (statement of Sen. Al Gore) (“In the long run,
doctors themselves are in the best position to put an end to malpractice. As some of the
most highly trained individuals in our society, physicians are ideally qualified to hold their
profession to the highest standard. But doctors and other health care personnel will never be
able to police their own ranks until Federal laws are changed to protect peer review.”);
Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 66 (statement of Dr. Sidney Wolfe, Director, Public
Citizen Health Research Group) (“Every physician I know in the country who is practicing
medicine tells me that there are one or more physicians at his or her hospital who are
incompetent and when I say why are they still there, they say we are afraid to bring an action
against them because they will retaliate and so forth.”); H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, pt. 1, at 3
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6385 (“Doctors who are sufficiently fearful of the
threat of litigation will simply not do meaningful peer review.”).
17. H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, pt. 1, at 2 (1986) (“Unfortunately, groups such as state
licensing boards, hospitals and medical societies that should be weeding out incompetent or
unprofessional doctors often do not do so.”).
18. See Susan O. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No Benefit—
Is It Time For A Change?, 25 AM. J. L & MED. 7, 59 (1999). Congressional legislative
history also shows that this was a federal problem. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 131
(statement of Dr. William Mixon, former president, American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists) (“The immunity granted in the bill would overcome . . . shortcomings in
state law and the absence of protection for peer review in federal law.”).
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While a majority of states already had legislation to protect both
professional review and dismissal of physicians by the time Congress
passed the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, the terminated physicians
could work around these state immunity laws by filing actions in federal
court.19 Usually the federal claims were grounded in federal antitrust law.
An example of this type of litigation, and something that Congress noted as
“a primary impetus for . . . immunity” in the form of the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act,20 was the case of Patrick v. Burget.21
Dr. Patrick had worked for the Astoria Clinic and Columbia
Memorial Hospital in Astoria, Oregon as a general and vascular surgeon.22
He was invited by the partners of the Astoria Clinic to join them as a
partner, but he declined and instead opened up his own, independent clinic
that competed with the Astoria Clinic.23 As a result, the doctors at the
Astoria Clinic cut ties with Dr. Patrick and refused to give him referrals.24
Ultimately, they initiated a peer review process at Columbia Memorial
Hospital and Dr. Patrick resigned before the hospital could revoke his
privileges.25 He filed suit in the United States District Court for the District
of Oregon claiming violations of the Sherman Act because the peer review
had been conducted in order to reduce competition as opposed to improve
patient care.26 The jury returned an award of $650,000 on the antitrust
claims.27 As required by law, the District Court trebled the damages.28
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
peer review proceedings were immune from antitrust scrutiny under the
state-action exemption from antitrust liability.29 As explained by the Ninth
Circuit, “[t]he doctrine exempts from the antitrust laws actions by the state
such as passage of laws by the legislature or promulgation of rules by the
state Supreme Court acting in its legislative capacity.”30 If the action is not
directly undertaken by the state legislature or the state Supreme Court, it
must be “taken pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
state policy and must be subject to active supervision by the state.”31 In this
19. Scheutzow, supra note 18, at 58.
20. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 27 (statement of Rep. Don Edwards,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights) (Note that Edwards refers to this
case as Patrick v. Astoria Clinic in the legislative history.).
21. 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d, 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
22. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 95–96.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 97.
26. Id. at 97–98.
27. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 98.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1505 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Hoover v. Ronwin,
466 U.S. 558, 567–68 (1984)).
31. Id. (citing S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48
(1985)).
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case, because Oregon required licensing of its health care facilities and also
required that procedures existed for granting or restricting privileges of
medical staff employed by those facilities, Oregon was compelling
physicians to review their competitors and had “affirmatively . . . expressed
a policy to replace pure competition with some regulation.”32
The Supreme Court ultimately held, reversing the Ninth Circuit,
that the state-action exemption did not immunize the hospital and federal
antitrust law would apply.33 The Court found that Oregon did not satisfy
the active supervision part of the required test and thus did not “exercise
ultimate control over the challenged anticompetitive conduct.”34 None of
the state actors mentioned by the Ninth Circuit or argued by the
respondents, “[had] succeeded in showing that any of these actors
reviews—or even could review—private decisions regarding hospital
privileges to determine whether such decisions comport with state
regulatory policy and to correct abuses.”35
However, the Court noted that it was responsive to policy
arguments articulated in amici briefs that “effective peer review is essential
to the provision of quality medical care and that any threat of antitrust
liability [would] prevent physicians from participating openly and actively
in peer-review proceedings.”36 The Court responded that this argument was
essentially about whether antitrust law should be applied in the area of
medical care, a question properly addressed to the legislative branch.37 This
question had already been answered, in part, with the passage of the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act.38 Thus, the Court would not erect a barrier
to federal court for physicians wishing to use antitrust law against hospitals.
The Supreme Court would also later interpret the jurisdictional
requirement of the Sherman Act broadly, allowing even more cases to be
brought into federal court against hospitals under federal antitrust law.39
The Court recognized a federal cause of action by a physician who had lost
medical privileges (or been denied those privileges) against the hospital or
peer review committee if the physician alleged that the decision of that
hospital or committee violated the Sherman Act.40 In the case of Summit
Health v. Pinhas, the Court concluded that even though a hospital’s main
32. Id. at 1505–06.
33. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 105.
34. Id. at 101 (“The active supervision prong of the . . . test requires that state officials
have and exercise power to review particular anticompetitive acts of private parties and
disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy. Absent such a program of supervision,
there is no realistic assurance that a private party’s anticompetitive conduct promotes state
policy, rather than merely the party’s individual interests.”).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 105 n.8.
39. See, e.g., Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 328–33 (1991).
40. Id. at 332–33.
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activity was providing health care services to a local market, it also engaged
in interstate commerce.41 Therefore to initiate an action under antitrust law,
there was no requirement of a manifest intent to actually restrain interstate
commerce but rather any attempt to prevent the hospital from expanding
would be covered by the Sherman Act.42 Merely the purchase of out-ofstate medicines and supplies as well as revenues from out-of-state insurance
companies would establish the appropriate interstate nexus.43 Thus, a
conspiracy on the part of the hospital (or a peer review panel) to terminate a
doctor’s privileges at a hospital would frustrate interstate commerce in the
giving of medical services and potentially violate the Sherman Act.44
Congress accordingly had the power to regulate the peer review process.45
This power to regulate extended also to reporting on the results of peer
review as “reports concerning peer review proceedings are routinely
distributed across state lines and affect doctors’ employment opportunities
throughout the Nation.”46 Therefore, overall there could be “no doubt
concerning the power of Congress to regulate [the] peer review process.”47
Congress had intervened amidst antitrust litigation and medical
malpractice suits and passed the Health Care Quality Improvement Act,
“[t]o encourage good faith professional review activities of health care
entities, to require collection and dissemination to hospitals and other health
care providers of information concerning certain payments in medical
malpractice claims and certain adverse decisions, and for other purposes.”48
Congress was worried about “the chilling effect which treble damages in an
antitrust claim can have on effective peer review,”49 and these federal
damage awards and claims were, of course, outside of the reach of statebased immunity laws. However, the immunity provided in the federal
statute was much broader than any individual state law in that it insulated
health care entities not only from antitrust lawsuits, but extended to “any
41. Id. at 329.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Id. at 330 (“A violation [of the Sherman Act] may still be found . . . liability
may be established by proof of either an unlawful purpose or an anticompetitive effect.”
(quoting McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980))).
45. Summit Health, 500 U.S. at 332–33 (“We have no doubt concerning the power of
Congress to regulate a peer review process controlling access to the market for
ophthalmological surgery in Los Angeles. Thus, respondent’s claim that members of the
peer review committee conspired with others to abuse that process and thereby deny
respondent access to the market for ophthalmological services provided by general hospitals
in Los Angeles has a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce to support federal
jurisdiction.”).
46. Id. at 327–28.
47. Id. at 332.
48. Heath Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, H.R. 5540, 99th Cong. (as reported
by the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Sept. 17, 1986).
49. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 27 (statement of Rep. Don Edwards,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights).
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law of the United States or of any State.”50 In reviewing the bill before its
passage, the task of the Committee on the Judiciary was partially to
“consider the implications of such a broad immunity, and to explore the
balance between encouraging peer review on the one hand and preserving
important rights and remedies on the other.”51
The Committee on Energy and Commerce reported “the purpose of
this legislation is to improve the quality of medical care by encouraging
physicians to identify and discipline other physicians who are incompetent
or who engage in unprofessional behavior.”52 However, “it [was] the
Committee’s intent that physicians receive fair and unbiased review to
protect their reputations and medical practices.”53 Part of this protection for
physicians included the “due process and other standards provided in the
bill.”54
As described by the Eleventh Circuit in interpreting the statute:
Congress enacted the HCQIA to address the rising problem
of medical malpractice and the ability of incompetent
doctors to move between states without having their prior
practice records follow them . . . We conclude that the
intent of . . . the federal . . . statute [], therefore, is “to
facilitate the frank exchange of information among
professionals conducting peer review inquiries without the
fear of reprisals in civil lawsuits.”55
This balancing of interests is important. As noted by Richard Kusserow,
the Inspector General for the Department of Health and Human Services at
the time HCQIA was passed, public perception about the adequacy of
hospital board discipline had shifted.56 The public had become increasingly
frustrated with boards not protecting patients but was also dissatisfied with
the time it took to conduct a proper hearing.57 He remarked, “the public
perceives that bad doctors should not be practicing medicine, but we must
give these doctors due process. Not everyone understands this.”58

50. 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1) (2013).
51. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 27 (statement of Rep. Don Edwards).
52. H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, pt. 1, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6385.
53. Id. at 11.
54. Id. at 2.
55. Ming Wei Liu v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 330 F. App’x 775, 779 (11th Cir.
2009) (quoting Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg’l Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir.
1994)).
56. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 37.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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B. Structure of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act
HCQIA provides immunity from monetary damages to a hospital
and the individual members of a peer review committee for the termination
or suspension of a physician’s privileges if those actions comport with the
proper statutory requirements.59 The statute also mandates a reporting
system, implemented by the Secretary of Health and Human Services into a
national registry and data bank. “Under the national reporting system,
insurance companies are required to report medical malpractice
payments . . . ; boards of medical examiners are required to report sanctions
imposed against physicians . . . ; and health care entities are required to
report adverse professional review information.”60 Hospitals are also under
a duty to request information from the Secretary in order to grant privileges
to a physician or licensed health care professional.61 Once privileges are
granted, hospitals must renew their request every two years and update that
information.62
The Data Bank created by the Secretary under authority from the
statute thus prevents a physician who applies for privileges at a hospital
from being able to conceal disciplinary actions that have been taken against
him or her.63 The Data Bank information reports not only the hospital’s
findings but also the physician’s response.64 However, the hiring hospital is
under no obligation to turn away a physician due to the information
supplied by the previous hospital or the Data Bank. As the Eleventh Circuit
explained:
What the requesting hospital does with the information it
obtains from the Data Bank is entirely up to that hospital.
It could completely discount the information, or it could
back off from any professional relationship with the
physician, or it could make further inquiries to determine
what had actually happened.65
If a hospital or health care entity does not participate in the national
reporting system, the Secretary may publish the entity’s name in the Federal

59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11111(a), 11112(a) (2013).
60. Imperial v. Suburban Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 37 F.3d 1026, 1028 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing
§§ 11131–11133 (2013)).
61. § 11137(a).
62. Id. § 11135(a).
63. See, e.g., Leal v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 620 F.3d 1280,
1283 (11th Cir. 2010).
64. Id. at 1284.
65. Id.
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Register.66 If an entity’s name is published, it may not receive the
immunity provided by the statute for a three-year period.67
However, in order to receive immunity initially, the statute requires
a professional review action to be taken in accordance with certain
requirements found in § 11112(a):
a professional review action must be taken—
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the
furtherance of quality health care,
(2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter,
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are
afforded to the physician involved or after such other
procedures as are fair to the physician under the
circumstances, and
(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by
the facts known after such reasonable effort to obtain facts
and after meeting the requirement of paragraph (3).68
It is clear from the legislative history surrounding the creation of these
factors that they were established to ensure that physicians being reviewed
by private hospitals were provided something akin to adequate due
process.69 Congress patently provided for due process in §§ 11112(b) and
11112(c), expanding on the nature of the “adequate notice and hearing
procedures” required in § 11112(a)(3).

66. Imperial v. Suburban Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 37 F.3d 1026, 1028 (4th Cir. 1994).
67. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11111(b) (2013)).
68. § 11112. The statute was amended in § 11111 to clarify that all of the standards
must be met in order to receive immunity. See § 11111; 132 CONG. REC. 30,766 (1986).
69. See, e.g., Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 52 (statement of Rep. Ron Wyden)
(“[W]e have given physicians under review full due process rights with notice and
representation.”) (emphasis added); H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, pt. 1, at 2 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6385 (“The purpose of this legislation is to improve the quality of
medical care by encouraging physicians to identify and discipline other physicians who are
incompetent or who engage in unprofessional behavior. . . . [P]eer review will be
protected . . . provided the peer review actions meet the due process and other standards
provided in the bill.”) (emphasis added); 132 CONG. REC. 30,767 (1986) (“These provisions
are now referred to in the amendment as “notice and hearing requirements.” The substantive
provisions remain unchanged. This change in terminology is intended to preclude the
implication that the bill defines “due process” for any purpose beyond the purview of the
bill.”).
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Section 11112(b) provides a list of “safe harbor” provisions, which
if met by the hospital or peer review committee, can be used to satisfy
§ 11112(a)(3).70 These safe harbor provisions provide:
[§ 11112](b): Adequate notice and hearing[:] A health care
entity is deemed to have met the adequate notice and
hearing requirement of subsection (a)(3) of this section
with respect to a physician if the following conditions are
met (or are waived voluntarily by the physician):
(1) Notice of proposed action[,] The physician has been
given notice stating—
(A)(i) that a professional review action has been
proposed to be taken against the physician,
(ii) reasons for the proposed action,
(B)(i) that the physician has the right to request a
hearing on the proposed action,
(ii) any time limit (of not less than 30 days) within
which to request such a hearing, and
(C) a summary of the rights in the hearing under
paragraph (3).
(2) Notice of hearing[,] If a hearing is requested on a timely
basis under paragraph (1)(B), the physician involved must
be given notice stating—
(A) the place, time, and date, of the hearing, which
date shall not be less than 30 days after the date of
the notice, and
(B) a list of the witnesses (if any) expected to
testify at the hearing on behalf of the professional
review body.
(3) Conduct of hearing and notice[,] If a hearing is
requested on a timely basis under paragraph (1)(B)—
(A) subject to subparagraph (B), the hearing shall
be held (as determined by the health care entity)—
70. § 11112(b).

2015]
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(i) before an arbitrator mutually acceptable
to the physician and the health care entity,
(ii) before a hearing officer who is
appointed by the entity and who is not in
direct economic competition with the
physician involved, or
(iii) before a panel of individuals who are
appointed by the entity and are not in
direct economic competition with the
physician involved;
(B) the right to the hearing may be forfeited if the
physician fails, without good cause, to appear;
(C) in the hearing the physician involved has the
right—
(i) to representation by an attorney or other
person of the physician’s choice,
(ii) to have a record made of the
proceedings, copies of which may be
obtained by the physician upon payment of
any reasonable charges associated with the
preparation thereof,
(iii) to call, examine, and cross-examine
witnesses,
(iv) to present evidence determined to be
relevant by the hearing officer, regardless
of its admissibility in a court of law, and
(v) to submit a written statement at the
close of the hearing; and
(D) upon completion of the hearing, the physician
involved has the right—
(i) to receive the written recommendation
of the arbitrator, officer, or panel,
including a statement of the basis for the
recommendations, and
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(ii) to receive a written decision of the
health care entity, including a statement of
the basis for the decision.71
Clearly this is a robust list of provisions intended to give hospitals and other
health care entities an idea of what an “adequate notice and hearing” in this
context ought to contain.72 The Committee on Energy and Commerce
explains, “[t]he due process requirement can always be met by the
procedures specified in [§ 11112 ](b). . . . If other procedures are followed,
but are not precisely of the character spelled out in [§ 11112](b), the test of
‘adequacy’ may still be met under other prevailing law.”73 The Committee
does not specify what kind of test will apply to adequacy in these other
cases.74 However the Committee notes that some courts have requirements
for review activities and actions that might require fewer or different due
process rights than the one specified in the statute and that these
requirements should be taken into account for a proper analysis of whether
a hearing is adequate under the statute.75
Importantly, the language ending this subsection states that: “[a]
professional review body’s failure to meet the conditions described in this
subsection shall not, in itself, constitute failure to meet the standards of
subsection (a)(3) of this section.”76 Therefore, if the safe harbor provisions
of the statute are not met, that does not mean that the hearing is inadequate
under the statute. The safe harbor provisions are mere guidelines, not
requirements. There is consequently a gap between what the statute
71. Id.
72. However, there were even some concerns in the legislative history that the lengthy
due process provisions contained in the listed portion of the statute were insufficient. See,
e.g., 132 CONG. REC. 30,770 (1986) (statement of Rep. Don Edwards, Chairman, Subcomm.
on Civil and Constitutional Rights) (“In a host of ways, the due process procedures set forth
in the bill, fail to provide adequate safeguards to health care providers improperly before
peer review committees. Notice is inadequate; there appear to be no mechanisms for
compelling testimony or for providing the physician, in advance, with the evidence
supporting the peer review action; and, in the end, the ‘due process’ provisions of the bill are
merely advisory, not obligatory.”); Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 81–82 (statement of
Victor M. Glasberg) (“If the Federal Government is going to—if it is going to permit some
kind of immunity arising out of adherence to due process, that there should be a requirement
of full and reasonable notice, and I submit that vague and nonspecific reasons for the
proposed actions won’t make it. Doctors are going to get letters saying, ‘We have a problem
with these charts. . . .’ [T]he hospital will load it on. They will have culled the record, they
will have gone through everything, and the doctor in question will be made to respond to a
whole raft of allegations, within a period of time very short normally one or two weeks. . . . I
submit that there should [also] be a provision for access to records and copying of records,
as required for the fair defense of the case.”).
73. H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, pt.1, at 10 (1986).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 10–11. Again, there is no illumination about what kind of tests these are or
what other tests for adequacy might contain.
76. § 11112(b) (emphasis added).
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requires under these provisions and what kind of process a peer review
committee needs to provide to meet the floor of adequacy.77 However, the
statute itself gives no particular insight into what satisfies for adequate
notice and hearing outside of the safe harbor requirements.
The third point under this section in the statute, § 11112(c),
provides certain conditions under which adequate notice and hearing
process may be suspended or satisfied due to several emergency situations:
[§ 11112](c) Adequate procedures in investigations or
health emergencies[:] For purposes of section 111111(a) of
this title, nothing in this section shall be construed as-(1) requiring the procedures referred to in
subsection (a)(3) of this section—
(A) where there is no adverse professional
review action taken, or
(B) in the case of a suspension or
restriction of clinical privileges, for a
period of not longer than 14 days, during
which an investigation is being conducted
to determine the need for a professional
review action; or
(2) precluding an immediate suspension or
restriction of clinical privileges, subject to
subsequent notice and hearing or other adequate
procedures, where the failure to take such an action
may result in an imminent danger to the health of
any individual.78
Thus if no professional review action is taken, as defined elsewhere in the
statute, or there is a relatively short time period or danger involved in taking
the time for more process, then the bar for adequacy of process may be
moved lower.79 The Committee on Energy and Commerce also notes that
“due process can be different in health emergencies . . . .”80

77. This statement seems to undermine the entire section. Subcomm. Hearings, supra
note 2, at 80 (statement of Victor M. Glasberg) (“The immunity is predicated on the due
process being provided and then at the end of the provision they say, oh, by the way, with
regard to that due process, if you didn’t provide it, it doesn’t matter. That is not right.”).
78. § 11112(c).
79. Id.
80. H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, at 6.

14

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2: 1

II. CIRCUIT COURTS’ INTERPRETATION OF THE HEALTH CARE
QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT
Since the passage of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act in
1986, circuit-level courts have interpreted it or considered its provisions
only seventy-two times.81 Only twenty-six of these cases dealt specifically
with § 11112(a)(3) of HCQIA, which invokes the requirement that the peer
review action at issue provide adequate notice and hearing procedures.82 If
it is so imperative that doctors be protected during the peer review process,
even as the occurrence and reporting of that process is being incentivized,
then why is there not more litigation on this issue in the more than twentyfive years since the statute has been in existence? Courts have skirted the
application of § 11112(a)(3) through finding a lack of an independent cause
of action in the statute, waiver of the part of physicians, or the use of
summary judgment to solve the problem as a pure legal question where the
presumption lands against the physician.
A. Presentation of Statutory Due Process Argument before Circuit
Courts
Initially, an obstacle to analyzing due process requirements under
the statute stems from the fact that HCQIA itself provides no independent
cause of action for a physician against a hospital.83 There is nothing in the
text of the statute itself to support a cause of action where a physician could
sue a hospital for lack of due process in this area, but the Supreme Court
has said in some cases statutory causes of action may be implied.84 In order
to determine whether an implied cause of action exists, four factors must be
considered:
First, is the plaintiff ‘one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted,’ that is, does the statute
create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is
there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?
81. This number was derived from performing a Westlaw search for “HCQIA” in the
federal circuit courts. Those cases were then reviewed for relevance and are available in list
format in a chart on file with the author [hereinafter “Chart”].
82. Chart, supra note 81.
83. Three separate circuit courts have ruled specifically on this issue. Wayne v.
Genesis Med. Ctr., 140 F.3d 1145, 1148 (8th Cir. 1998); Bok v. Mut. Assurance, Inc., 119
F.3d 927, 928 (11th Cir. 1997); Hancock v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Kan., 21 F.3d 373,
374–75 (10th Cir. 1994).
84. Bok, 119 F.3d at 928 (“When legislation does not provide expressly for a cause of
action for individual plaintiffs, the legislation must provide an implied cause of action in
order for individual plaintiffs to be able to sue under the legislation.” (citing Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975))).
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Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?
And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of
the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause
of action based solely on federal law?85
The lower courts that have analyzed the issue of an implied cause of action
in HCQIA have uniformly rejected an implied cause of action in the
statute.86 Instead, these courts have concluded that Congress did not enact
the statute for the purpose of benefitting physicians but rather to encourage
peer review against physicians.87 This means that even if a hospital did not
provide adequate notice and a hearing, a physician may not sue a hospital
on that basis.
There is a possible cause of action for physicians that are reviewed
by public hospitals, as their actions would potentially be governed by
constitutional due process protections. State actors are not permitted to
infringe on certain protected interests without providing proper due process
of law.88 However, public hospitals comprise less than twenty-five percent
of all hospitals in the United States, so it is much less common for issues to
arise from the peer review process.89 Moreover, private health care entities
do not have a parallel restriction unless one can be mined from the language
or purposes of HCQIA. Any statutory protection for due process, however,

85. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added).
86. Wayne, 140 F.3d at 1148 (“HCQIA does not explicitly or implicitly afford
aggrieved physicians a cause of action when a hospital fails to follow the HCQIA’s
prescribed peer review procedures.”); Bok, 119 F.3d at 929 (“Concluding that the HCQIA
does not provide for a private cause of action . . . .”); Hancock, 21 F.3d at 374 (“However,
the HCQIA does not expressly create a cause of action in favor of a physician against a
professional peer review group that has violated its due process requirements.” (citing and
accepting the trial court’s opinion)).
87. Wayne, 140 F.3d at 1148 (“The HCQIA’s grant of immunity to review boards
strongly suggests that the Act was not enacted to benefit the physician undergoing peer
review.”); Bok, 119 F.3d at 929 (“We agree . . . that Congress did not pass the HCQIA with
the intent of benefiting physicians . . . .”); Hancock, 21 F.3d at 374 (“ . . . HCQIA was not
enacted to benefit physicians subject to peer review . . . .”). These courts have also agreed
that an overall weighing of the Cort factors also does not favor finding an implied cause of
action. Wayne, 140 F.3d at 1148 (“We conclude that none of these relevant factors weights
in favor of an implied cause of action.”); Bok, 119 F.3d at 929 (“More importantly, a
weighing of the Cort factors also argues against finding an implied cause of action in the
HCQIA.”); Hancock, 21 F.3d at 374 (“A weighing of the factors outlined in Cort v. Ash
leads the court to conclude that Congress did not intend to create a cause of action for the
benefit of physicians to enforce provisions of the HCQIA.” (citing and accepting the trial
court’s opinion)).
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
89. TARESSA FRAZE ET AL., HEALTHCARE COST AND UTILIZATION PROJECT,
STATISTICAL BRIEF #95: PUBLIC HOSPITALS IN THE UNITED STATES 2008 (2010), available at
http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb95.pdf.
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would still not provide an independent cause of action for this type of
violation.
If an argument about the adequacy of procedures is raised to a
court, it is raised only to mitigate the immunity that a hospital is already
using as a shield. Therefore, a physician would sue for an independent
claim such as defamation or antitrust and the hospital would assert HCQIA
immunity against such a claim.90 In order to overcome this immunity
defense, a physician would then raise the issue about adequacy of
proceedings to defeat that immunity. Inadequate procedures are never
enough under HCQIA to initiate the physician’s claim—no matter how
severe the violation.
Courts have tried to soften this analysis with the understanding that
HCQIA only provides immunity for monetary damages and does not
prevent declaratory or injunctive relief.91 For example, the Fifth Circuit in
Polinar v. Texas Health Systems explained:
It bears emphasizing that . . . hospitals and peer review
committees that comply with the HCQIA’s requirements
are [not] free to violate the applicable bylaws and state law.
The HCQIA does not gainsay the potential for abuse of the
peer review process. To the contrary, Congress limited the
reach of immunity to money damages. The doors to the
courts remain open to doctors who are subjected to
unjustified or malicious peer review, and they may seek
appropriate injunctive or declaratory relief in response to
such treatment. The immunity from money damages may
work harsh outcomes in certain circumstances, but that
results from Congress’ decision that the system-wide
benefit of robust peer review in rooting out incompetent
physicians, protecting patients, and preventing malpractice
outweighs those occasional harsh results; that giving
physicians access to the courts to assure procedural
protections while denying a remedy of money damages
strikes the balance of remedies essential to Congress’
objective of vigorous peer review. The doctor may not
recover money damages, but can access the court for other
relief preventive of an abusive peer review.92
However, none of the cases before courts of appeals argued or raised the
issue of declaratory or injunctive relief. This is partially because HCQIA
90. It is true that HCQIA only immunizes for monetary damages, and injunctive or
declaratory relief is still available. 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a) (2013).
91. See, e.g., Polinar v. Tex. Health Sys., 537 F.3d 368, 381 (5th Cir. 2008); Freilich
v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205, 211 (4th Cir. 2002).
92. Polinar, 537 F.3d at 381.
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does not provide a cause of action to remedy lack of procedure but only
provides immunity. It may also be that monetary damages are the desired
remedy to deter problematic peer review. The converse of this is also
unfortunately true, if a hospital violates its bylaws or state laws in providing
procedure to a physician, HCQIA offers no protection. As the Fourth
Circuit notes, “[n]othing in HCQIA makes immunity depend on adherence
to bylaws.”93
There are also times where a physician will either intentionally or
unintentionally waive his or her ability to raise a procedural claim.94 For
example, in the Fourth Circuit a plaintiff physician waived his right to
object before the court because he did not object to the composition of a
hearing panel at the time it was convened.95 To be fair, the statute does
explicitly state in § 11112(b) that the requirements of subsection (a)(3) will
be met if they are “waived voluntarily by the physician.”96 However, if the
requirements under the safe harbor provision are not requirements at all but
mere guidelines, how confident can a court be that a physician has properly
waived them or even understands what pieces of process are necessary to
induce fairness at the time of the hearing? Without a rubric or a firm list of
requirements, waiver seems at best to be illusory.
Even when claims about proper procedural process are raised, the
larger claim about HCQIA immunity is usually settled at the summary
judgment stage. Courts have broadly viewed the presence of immunity as a
“question of law for the court to decide . . . [that] may be resolved
whenever the record in a particular case becomes sufficiently developed.”97
The Eleventh Circuit pointed out in Bryan v. James E. Holmes Regional
Medical Center that the House Committee intended for the provisions of
HCQIA to allow defendants to resolve the issue of immunity in as
expeditious a manner as possible and intended for a court to determine
immunity even though other issues remained to be resolved.98 The court
noted, “[t]he substantive standards under HCQIA remain the same
regardless of the point at which the immunity determination occurs.”99 The
court then compared HCQIA immunity with immunity under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and held that qualified immunity in either case should not become a
part of the jury instructions once the defense has been denied on a motion
for summary judgment.100 While not making this same direct comparison,
93. Wieters v. Roper Hosp., Inc., 58 Fed.Appx. 40, 46 (4th Cir. 2003).
94. See e.g., Moore v. Williamsburg Reg’l Hosp., 560 F.3d 166, 176 (4th Cir. 2009);
Meyers v. Columbia/HCA Health Corp., 341 F.3d 461, 470 (6th Cir. 2003); Sugarbaker v.
SSM Health Care, 190 F.3d 905, 915 (8th Cir. 1999); Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg’l Med.
Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318, 1336 (11th Cir. 1994).
95. Moore, 560 F.3d at 176.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(b) (2013).
97. Bryan, 33 F.3d at 1332.
98. Id. at 1332 and n.24.
99. Id. at 1332.
100. Id. at 1332–33.
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other courts have similarly concluded that the issue of immunity is a legal
question.101
Contrariwise, the First Circuit in Singh v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
Massachusetts, Inc., would draw a line between immunity under HCQIA
with immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because “[q]ualified immunity
determinations under § 1983 are ‘question[s] of law, subject to resolution
by the judge and not the jury,’ while HCQIA immunity determinations may
be resolved by a jury if they cannot be resolved at the summary judgment
stage.”102 Making this division would make HCQIA immunity, especially
questions involving adequate process, a fact-based question that could be
answered by either a judge or a jury as opposed to a pure legal question.
The court found this distinction appropriate because qualified immunity
analysis for § 1983 involves a “quintessential legal question: whether the
rights at issue are clearly established.”103 HCQIA immunity does not
involve such a clear legal question, although the court did concede that
“determinations under the HCQIA may often become legal determinations
appropriate for resolution by the judge at summary judgment.”104 A further
distinction was drawn between the two types of immunity because qualified
immunity under § 1983 is an immunity from suit that is effectively lost if a
case is erroneously permitted to go to trial while HCQIA is a mere defense
to liability for monetary damages only.105 If a suit is improperly allowed to
continue when § 1983 immunity is present, the harm is partially in merely
allowing the suit to continue. However, under HCQIA, if money damages
are not awarded, litigating over whether they should be does not violate the
immunity in and of itself.106
The First Circuit further argues that there is no reason to insulate
the determination of proper peer review actions from jurors, because while
peer review actions may not be “within the common experience of jurors,
they are not so esoteric that they cannot be fairly evaluated by jurors,
perhaps with the assistance of expert witnesses.”107 If jurors are asked to
conclude about the quality of medical care in medical malpractice cases,
there is no reason to exclude them from decisions about immunity
determinations under the statute.108
101. See, e.g., Doe v. La. Psychiatric Med. Ass’n, No. 96-30232, 1996 WL 670414, at
*2 (5th Cir. Oct. 28, 1996) (“[T]he issue of immunity is a legal question for the court to
decide.”); Parsons v. Sanchez, No. 93-55656, 1995 WL 21695, at *4 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 1995)
(“Congress intended for the court to address the immunity issue well before trial.”).
102. 308 F.3d 25, 34–35 (1st Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 35.
104. Id. at 36.
105. Id. at 35.
106. Id. See also Decker v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 982 F.2d 433, 436 (10th Cir. 1992)
(holding that HCQIA immunity is “immunity from liability only,” not an immunity from
suit).
107. Singh, 308 F.3d at 35.
108. Id.
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While some courts debate about whether the issue of immunity
should ever be given to a jury, other courts avoid the issue by simply
resolving immunity determinations under HCQIA at the summary judgment
stage. However, summary judgment determinations about immunity in this
context are described by most courts to be “unusual” because of a
presumption provision contained in the statute.109 The statute states, after
laying out the requirements necessary for a health care entity to receive
immunity, that “[a] professional review action shall be presumed to have
met the preceding standards necessary for the protection set out in section
11111(a) of this title unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance
of the evidence.”110 This presumption language creates a standard for
summary judgment that asks, irrespective of the party moving for summary
judgment, “[m]ight a reasonable jury, viewing the facts in the best light for
[the plaintiff physician] conclude that [he/she] has shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the [defendant hospital’s or defendant
physicians’] actions are outside the scope of § 11112(a)?”111 This means
that “the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the peer review process
was not reasonable.”112 Courts have understood this statutory language to
“place[] a high burden on physicians to demonstrate that a professional
review action should not be afforded immunity.”113 A lack of a cause of
action contained in HCQIA combined with inappropriate waiver and a
presumption that health care entities should receive immunity explains why
this issue rarely presents itself before federal courts, and why so few
physicians have been able to overcome these obstacles.
B. Analysis of Statutory Due Process before Circuit Courts
Circuit courts attempted to interpret or apply HCQIA seventy-two
times since the statute was enacted, but only dealt with the issue of whether
adequate notice and hearing was provided twenty-six times.114 Of those
twenty-six cases, four were summary affirmations—the courts indicated
that the physician had not provided by a preponderance of the evidence that

109. See, e.g., Moore v. John Deere Health Care Plan, Inc., 492 F. App’x 632, 636 (6th
Cir. 2012); Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2009)
(calling it an “unconventional standard”); Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 202
(3d Cir. 2005); Lee v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 408 F.3d 1064, 1070 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The
statutory presumption . . . adds a rather unconventional twist to the burden of proof in our
summary judgment standard of review.”); Meyers v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 341
F.3d 461, 468 (6th Cir. 2003); Singh, 308 F.3d at 33–34; Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg’l
Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318, 1333 (11th Cir. 1994); Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 733–34
(9th Cir. 1992).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (2013) (emphasis added).
111. Austin, 979 F.2d at 733–34.
112. Bryan, 33 F.3d at 1333.
113. See, e.g., Gordon, 423 F.3d at 202.
114. Chart, supra note 81.
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the process was inadequate with absolutely no explanation or reasoning.115
Only twice did the physician prevail in while claiming an issue of
inadequate hearing or notice (and only three times total out of seventy-two
cases did the physician prevail in any capacity) and the courts found in
those cases that the district courts simply did not consider the issue of
HCQIA or whether the presumption was overcome and instructed them to
do so.116 However, in both of those cases, the physician was ultimately
denied any relief from HCQIA immunity.117
Initially, it is important to note, that the courts, like Congress,
believe strongly that § 11112(a)(3) provides a due process component.118
115. Three of these summary affirmations occurred in the Fifth Circuit and one in the
Third Circuit. Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 85 F. App’x 308 (3d Cir. 2004); Van
v. Anderson, 66 F. App’x 524 (5th Cir. 2003); Payne v. Harris Methodist HEB, 44 F. App’x
652 (5th Cir. 2002); Pickett v. HCA Hosp. Corp., 199 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 1999).
116. Bundren v. Parriott, 245 F. App’x 822, 826 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Dr.
Bundren . . . attacked the fairness of the . . . proceeding . . . . Given these attacks on
the . . . proceeding, the district court should have determined whether Dr. Bundren had
overcome the presumption that the § 11112(a) factors were met. It did not do so.”); Brader v.
Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 64 F.3d 869, 879 (3d Cir. 1995) (“If Brader’s allegations, such as the
alleged failure to provide Brader with fair hearing procedures, are true, the defendants would
not be entitled to HCQIA immunity We therefore decline to affirm the district court’s
dismissal of Brader’s claims on the alternative grounds of HCQIA immunity.”). The third
case of a doctor prevailing under HCQIA was Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Services,
but it did not have to do with adequate notice and hearing. 101 F.3d 1324, 1333 (10th Cir.
1996) (“At trial, Dr. Brown presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the peer review action was not taken after a ‘reasonable
effort to obtain the facts of the matter.’”).
117. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment against the physician on the
merits of his original claims without regard to the claims of HCQIA immunity. Bundren, 245
F. App’x at 826–27. The Third Circuit later found that the hospital had met the requirements
under HCQIA for immunity. Brader, 167 F.3d at 832.
118. See, e.g., Johnson v. Spohn, 334 F. App’x 673, 682 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[A]ppellees
were required to grant Dr. Johnson due process protections at some point prior to the final
revocation of his medical staff membership and clinical privileges.”) (emphasis added);
Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205, 211 (4th Cir. 2002) (“For HCQIA
immunity to attach, however, the peer review action must comport with due process.”)
(emphasis added); Sugarbaker v. SSM Healthcare, 190 F.3d 905, 915 (8th Cir. 1999) (“The
failure to provide a physician with adequate notice and fair procedures precludes immunity
under the HCQIA. Dr. Sugarbaker asserts that evidence . . . rebut[s] the presumption that St.
Mary’s provided adequate notice and due process in this case.”) (emphasis added); Mathews
v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 632 (3d Cir. 1996) (“The standards that a professional
review action must satisfy in order to entitle participants in the review process to
immunity . . . include certain fairness and due process requirements.”) (emphasis added);
Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg’l Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 1994)
(“Accordingly, HCQIA provides that, if a ‘professional review action’ (as defined in the
statute) meets certain due process and fairness requirements, then those participating in such
a review process shall not be liable . . . .”) (emphasis added); Hancock v. Blue Cross-Blue
Shield of Kan., Inc., 21 F.3d 373, 374 (10th Cir. 1994) (“The HCQIA’s granting of
professional peer review immunity, however, is conditioned by two factors. First, a
professional peer review group must provide adequate due process protection to the
physician subjected to review.”) (emphasis added); Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 733
(9th Cir. 1992) (“HCQIA provides that if a ‘professional review action’ (as defined in
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The immunity contained in the statute is conditioned partially upon a
provision of “adequate due process protection to the physician subjected to
the review.”119 However, the real problem is that courts have no way to
analyze whether due process protections in any given situation are
“adequate” besides holding them up to the safe harbor provisions of the
statute, or in some cases a hospital’s bylaws. Even when a hospital violates
its own bylaws or does not provide what is required under § 11112(b), a
court will point out that the statute does not require full compliance with
those listed procedures.120 There is no rubric for adequacy given in the
statute and courts have uniformly declined to adopt one. For example, the
Tenth Circuit in Hancock v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Kansas notes that a
professional peer review group must provide adequate due process
protection, but further states, “HCQIA details a number of procedures
which Congress deemed to be adequate due process, and creates a
rebuttable presumption that the professional peer review group met the due
process requirements even if it did not follow the HCQIA’s procedures.”121
Therefore there is no way inside the language of the statute for a court to
tell whether a health care entity has provided adequate notice and hearing
procedures but merely a requirement that these things exist. This line of
thinking renders the safe harbor provisions in § 11112(b) virtually
meaningless and does not help to provide physicians with any procedural
protection.
Courts have sometimes at least recognized that, at base, the due
process requirements in HCQIA must imply there is some kind of notice to
the physician and an opportunity for him or her to be heard (just like the
base requirement of constitutional due process).122 However, some courts
seem to be confusing the safe harbor provisions that can satisfy the
adequacy requirement as the only list against which violations may be
HCQIA) meets certain due process and fairness requirements, then those participating in the
review ‘shall not be liable in damages . . . .’”) (emphasis added).
119. Hancock, 21 F.3d at 374.
120. See, e.g., Wieters v. Roper Hosp., Inc., 58 F. App’x 40, 46 (4th Cir. 2003)
(“Although Dr. Wieters has pointed out parts of the process that did not hew strictly to the
bylaws and the safe harbor provisions, he has presented nothing that would lead a reasonable
jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the hospital treated him unfairly under
the circumstances.”); Meyers v. Columbia/HCA Health Corp., 341 F.3d 461, 469–70 (6th
Cir. 2003) (“[Doctor] argues that a reasonable jury could conclude that LMH did not provide
adequate notice and procedures because it did not comply with its own bylaws. . . . [E]ven
assuming LMH did violate the bylaws, the notice and procedures provided complied with
the HCQIA’s statutory ‘safe harbor’ . . . .”).
121. Hancock, 21 F.3d at 374 (emphasis added).
122. See, e.g., Soriano v. Neshoba Cnty. Gen. Hosp. Bd. of Trs., 486 F. App’x 444, 446
(5th Cir. 2012) (“His procedural due process rights were not violated. . . . ‘The essential
requirements of procedural due process under the Constitution are notice and an opportunity
to respond.’”) (citation omitted); Lee v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 408 F.3d 1064, 1072 (8th
Cir. 2005) (“We also reject Dr. Lee’s argument that the hospital did not afford her ‘adequate
notice and hearing procedures,’ as required by § 11112(a)(3) . . . . Dr. Lee had ample notice
and an opportunity to be heard.”).
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measured. In other words, these courts have held that if a piece of process
is not listed in the statute it is never required in order to have an adequate
process. For example, the Ninth Circuit in Smith v. Ricks involved a
challenge from Dr. Smith concerning his removal from Good Samaritan
Hospital.123 The court concluded that the allegation of defects in the
procedure was an attempt by Dr. Smith to convert “peer review proceedings
to look like regular trials in a court of law.”124 However, “nothing in the
statute requires such formalities.”125 This was held to be true even though
“[t]he statute expressly provides that hospitals need not meet all of the
§ 11112(b) requirements. The ultimate inquiry is whether the notice and
hearing procedures were adequate.”126 The court never identifies which
formalities suffice for adequacy and which are those that the statute does
not require. Ultimately the court does conclude that either the procedures
undertaken by the hospital satisfy § 11112(b) safe harbor provisions or they
are “so close to the ‘safe harbor’ that no reasonable jury could find Dr.
Smith rebutted the presumption that the procedures were adequate.”127 No
indication was given by the court as to how wide the margin of error was
for procedures to be “so close” to the safe harbor provisions as to still be
adequate.
Similarly, in the Fourth Circuit case of Freilich v. Upper
Chesapeake Health, Inc., the court concluded that Dr. Freilich’s seventeen
alleged procedural defects, including permitting hearsay and denying
hospital privileges when no incompetence had been found, were insufficient
to deny HCQIA immunity.128 Her allegations were interpreted by the court
that “she would like this court to rewrite the HCQIA. . . . [W]e cannot
substitute our judgment, or that of Dr. Freilich, for Congress’s rationally
based belief that the HCQIA is an effective means to achieve its goal.”129
Merely alleging that certain procedures were necessary to be “fair under her
circumstances” was tantamount to the court to a claim to rewrite the statute
to mandate them in all cases.
The First Circuit has also held that “the HCQIA procedural
standard does not require . . . such a procedural safeguard [as claimed by
the plaintiff]. Nothing in the Act requires that a physician be permitted to
participate in the review of his care.”130 Apparently, the fear is that in
imposing any additional requirements or of merely requiring some of the
requirements in the safe harbor provision would “force every informal
review activity of a doctor or a department into time-consuming and
123. 31 F.3d 1478, 1481 (9th Cir. 1994).
124. Id. at 1487.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1486. (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 1487.
128. 313 F.3d 205, 212 (4th Cir. 2002).
129. Id.
130. Singh v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 308 F.3d 25, 40 (1st Cir. 2002)
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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(depending on the outcome of the informal review) possibly unnecessary
formalized proceedings.”131
In some extreme cases, procedures that are “fair to the physician
under the circumstances” might even result in a complete lack of a hearing.
The Fourth Circuit in Wahi v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc.
concluded that not providing a hearing did not necessarily violate HCQIA’s
statutory requirements.132 The court interpreted the statute to provide
immunity in two capacities under § 11112(a)(3) because “[s]tated in the
disjunctive, the statute contemplates two independent avenues by which the
subsection (a) immunity prong may be obtained.”133 Either immunity can
be achieved by providing “adequate notice and hearing procedures” or it
may be obtained by using “other procedures as are fair to the physician
under the circumstances.”134 It is completely unclear why inadequate notice
and hearing procedures would ever be fair unless relying on the emergency
valve of § 11112(c) that is already provided. Even though the legislative
history notes a concerted effort to protect the doctor in the process of peer
review,135 the Fourth Circuit contends, “[n]othing in this legislative history
alters the conclusion that a health care entity can satisfy subsection (a)(3)
without providing a formal hearing, as contemplated in the safe harbor
provisions, depending on the circumstances of a particular case.”136 In
other words, sometimes it is fair to the physician under the circumstances to
provide no hearing at all.
There is no more of a rubric for “fairness” then there is for
“adequacy of proceedings,” should proceedings occur at all. Another
example of a hospital offering no hearing whatsoever is in the Ninth Circuit
case of Fox v. Good Samaritan Hospital, where:
[a]lthough Good Samaritan did not offer Fox a formal
administrative hearing, such a hearing was not necessary
under the unique circumstances of Fox’s case . . . . A
formal hearing geared toward resolving factual disputes
would therefore have done nothing to help Fox’s case or
aid Good Samaritan’s decision-making.137
Factual disputes are also necessary to lodge a constitutional procedural due
process claim,138 however, as physicians are unable to challenge the abuse
131. See Brader v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 167 F.3d 832, 842 (3d Cir. 1999).
132. 562 F.3d 599, 606 (4th Cir. 2009).
133. Id. at 608.
134. Id.
135. See Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 52.
136. Wahi, 562 F.3d at 609.
137. 467 F. App’x 731, 735 (9th Cir. 2012).
138. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977)(“But if the hearing mandated by the
Due Process Clause is to serve any useful purpose, there must be some factual dispute
between an employer and a discharged employee which has some significant bearing on the
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of a lack of hearing directly and may inadvertently waive their right to a
hearing, a complete lack of procedure seems inapposite to the purpose of
the statute. Furthermore, without notice or an opportunity to respond, it
may be impossible in some cases to determine whether there is indeed a
factual dispute.
Even with some resistance on the part of some circuit courts to
offer the overall question of HCQIA immunity to a jury,139 other courts
have concluded that summary judgment is appropriate because a reasonable
jury could find that the treatment of the physician was fair under the
circumstances.140 This type of conclusion begins with the premise that the
adequacy of process may be measured with an objective standard of
reasonableness.
There has been some debate in the circuit courts over the use of the
word “reasonable” in the other three standards that confer HCQIA
immunity:141 “a professional review action must be taken . . . in the
reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality health
care . . . after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter . . . in the
reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts known.”142
The Ninth Circuit contended that “the legislative history of HCQIA reveals
that Congress rejected a subjective standard in favor of an
objective . . . standard,” therefore, “the propriety of professional review
actions only concern[] issues of objective reasonableness.”143 This makes
any claims of bad faith on the part of the reviewing panel irrelevant to the
concern of whether it should receive immunity.144 The Eleventh Circuit
employee’s reputation.”). However, adequate notice and an opportunity to refute the charges
should there be some sort of factual dispute is still required.
139. See, e.g., Parsons v. Sanchez, No. 93-55656, 1995 WL 21695, at *4 (9th Cir. Jan.
19, 1995) (“Parsons contends that the immunity defense raises issues of subjective intent that
cannot be resolved at the summary judgment stage. We reject this argument, because the
propriety of professional review actions only concerns issues of objective reasonableness.”);
Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg’l Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1994).
140. Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 633 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Bryan,
33 F.3d at 1333) (“We must examine the record in this case to determine whether [Dr.
Mathews] satisfied his burden of producing evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to
conclude that the Hospital’s peer review disciplinary process failed to meet the standards of
the [Act].”).
141. See, e.g., Parsons, 1995 WL 21695; Bryan, 33 F.3d at 1335.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
143. Parsons, 1995 WL 21695, at *4. This is partially borne out in the language of the
Committee on Energy and Commerce Report. (“Initially, the Committee considered a ‘good
faith’ standard for professional review actions. In response to concerns that ‘good faith’
might be misinterpreted as requiring only a test of the subjective state of mind of the
physicians conducting the professional review action, the Committee changed to a more
objective ‘reasonable belief’ standard. The Committee intends that this test will be satisfied
if reviewers, with the information available to them at the time of the professional review
action, would reasonably have concluded that their action would restrict incompetent
behavior or would protect patients.”) H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, pt. 1, at 10 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6392.
144. Parsons, 1995 WL 21695, at *4–5.
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found immunity when a physician was terminated due to his hostile
behavior towards his fellow staff members.145 The hospital was found to
have acted in the reasonable belief that its actions were to protect patients
even though the physician claimed the action was a personal vendetta by
the board members.146 The court claimed that:
assertions of hostility do not support [the doctor’s] position
[that the Hospital is not entitled to the HCQIA’s
protections] because they are irrelevant to the
reasonableness standards of § 11112(a). The test is an
objective one, so bad faith is immaterial. The real issue is
the sufficiency of the basis for the [Hospital’s] actions.147
This kind of judicial interpretation ignores any motivation on the part of the
peer review committee or health care entity to abuse the peer review
process for reasons incompatible with patient care. Essentially the courts
are abdicating the oversight role given to them by the statute when
insulating their “reasonableness” analysis from clear subjective malice in
initiating the process of peer review or the conduction of procedures as a
whole. It also removes consideration of whether or not the decisionmaker
was neutral, which is a key consideration in constitutional procedural due
process claims.148
Courts also tend to read all of the requirements for immunity
together, imputing this objective reasonableness standard into the adequacy
component as well.149 This leads to minimal analysis about the adequacy of
145. Bryan, 33 F.3d at 1335.
146. Id.
147. Id. (quoting Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 734 (9th Cir. 1992)).
148. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1975) (“Clearly, if the initial view of the facts
based on the evidence derived from nonadversarial processes as a practical or legal matter
foreclosed fair and effective consideration at a subsequent adversary hearing leading to
ultimate decision, a substantial due process question would be raised.”).
149. See, e.g., Moore v. John Deere Health Care Plan, Inc., 492 F. App’x 632, 638 (6th
Cir. 2012) (“A professional review action is presumed to satisfy HCQIA’s four-factor
reasonableness test for immunity unless rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.”);
Cohlmia v. St. John Med. Ctr., 693 F.3d 1269, 1277 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The entity or persons
that undertake the professional review are immune under HCQIA as long as they
substantially comply with a list of objective standards set forth in the Act.”); Wahi v.
Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 562 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2009) (“In determining whether a
health care entity has met these four [immunity] requirements, the Court applies an objective
test . . . .”); Poliner v. Texas Health Sys., 537 F.3d 368, 377 (5th Cir. 2008) (“We agree with
our sister circuits that the HCQIA’s reasonableness requirements were intended to create an
objective standard of performance . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Singh v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 308 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2002) (“Adopting objective
reasonable belief standards, the HCQIA advances the Congressional purpose of permitting a
determination of immunity without extensive inquiry into the state of mind of peer
reviewers. . . . Our sister circuits have uniformly applied all the sections of § 11112(a) as
objective standards.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Smith v. Ricks, 31 F.3d 1478,
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any given proceeding and can even allow the immunity requirements to
blend into one sliding scale of “reasonableness” rather than four
independent, necessary requirements. Several circuits have relied on
whether the court believes in the abstract that a reasonable jury could
conclude that the process was unfair.150
The Fourth Circuit has further imported this objectivity into an
analytical framework that looks to the totality of the circumstances for
whether HCQIA immunity is appropriate.151 Even when a hospital failed to
follow its own bylaws and procedures manual or provide the doctor with a
list of witnesses who would testify against him, the court said, “[T]hese
failures by [Charleston Area Medical Center], when viewed in the totality
of the circumstances against a measuring stick of objective
reasonableness, do not show [Dr.] Wahi met his burden of proof to rebut
the presumption of immunity under the HCQIA.”152 According to the
court, if a physician can allege procedural deficiencies on behalf of the
hospital or reviewing panel, it is determined from a jury’s perspective
whether that renders the process unfair or objectively unreasonable.153
In 2013, the Fourth Circuit again used this rubric in the case of Dr.
Muniz, saying “[w]e do not believe that a reasonable jury could find that
the procedural irregularities involving the hearing officer—unwise though
some of them were—rendered Muniz’s peer review process unfair or
objectively unreasonable.”154 Rather than determine what procedures
would be appropriate to satisfy the statutory requirement, the court
concluded, “[a] reasonable jury could only conclude that it was ‘fair’ for the
Board to terminate Muniz after giving her extensive opportunity in a
lengthy hearing to explain her misrepresentations.”155 This kind of analysis
completely ignores the list of safe harbor provisions Congress provided in
§ 11112(b) as an example of a proceeding that would be adequate in favor
of the most informal procedure possible. It reduces the floor to mere notice
and an opportunity to be heard, with no real measuring calculus for either
component.

1485 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Because the ‘reasonableness’ requirements of § 11112(a) were
intended to create an objective standard . . . .”).
150. See, e.g., Moore, 492 F. App’x at 641 (“The district court found that a reasonable
jury could not find by a preponderance of evidence that the peer review action in this case
was taken in the absence of adequate notice and hearing procedures . . . . [T]he district court
correctly found that Moore failed to meet his burden . . . .”); Smith, 31 F.3d at 1487 (“Good
Samaritan’s procedures either fit into the § 11112(b)(3) ‘safe harbor,’ or are so close to the
‘safe harbor’ that no reasonable jury could find Dr. Smith rebutted the presumption that the
procedures were adequate.”).
151. Wahi, 562 F.3d at 606.
152. Id. at 614.
153. Id. at 607.
154. Hein-Muniz v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctrs., 532 F. App’x 342, 344 (4th Cir. 2013).
155. Id. at 345.
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III. IMPORTING CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS TO THE
HEALTH CARE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT
A.

Constitutional Due Process

When making a constitutional procedural due process claim, it is
necessary that the individual be subject to government action in an
individualized hearing that infringes on a protected interest.156 Once due
process has been triggered, a court must determine what process is due in
any given situation.157 There is no set standard of what procedures due
process may provide for in any particular adjudication, although case law
has created a continuum for the kinds of process that may be required.158
At the floor, due process requires merely that an individual be
given notice and an opportunity to be heard.159 At the ceiling, due process
can demand much or all of the process of a full trial.160 The Court in
Goldberg required significant procedure, including:
[T]imely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for the
proposed termination; an effective opportunity to defend by
confronting and cross-examining adverse witnesses and by
presenting his own arguments and evidence orally,
although informal procedures would suffice; the right to be
represented by counsel, although not the right to have
counsel provided; a decision that rests solely on the
evidence adduced at the hearing; an impartial
decisionmaker; and a statement by the decisionmaker
explaining his decision and the evidence relied upon,
although the statement need not be a “full opinion” or
contain “formal findings of fact and conclusions of law.”161
While requiring an exhaustive list of procedures, the Court in Goldberg
noted that “[t]he opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities

156. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 17.1 (2014).
157. Id. § 17.8(i).
158. Id. § 17.9(c)(i).
159. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (holding that a student in a public high
school was entitled to due process, but it was satisfied by minimal procedures) (“[O]ral or
written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the
evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story. The Clause
requires at least these rudimentary precautions against unfair or mistaken findings of
misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from school.”).
160. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268–69 (1970).
161. WILLIAM F. FUNK, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ADMIN. PROCEDURE
AND PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND CASES 259 (5th ed. 2014) (discussing requirements of
Goldberg).
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and circumstances of those who are to be heard.”162 Once this continuum
has been established, due process might require any number of procedures
ranging from informal to formal, and the critical question becomes, how
does a court tell what measure of process is constitutionally required in a
given case?
From an administrative law perspective, which seems appropriate
given the involvement of Health and Human Services under HCQIA, most
agencies have a choice of procedures when performing adjudications like a
peer review. Formal adjudications are only required when invoked under
§§ 554, 556, and 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act.163 Section 554
of the Administrative Procedure Act says that it will apply and trigger a
formal hearing “in every case of adjudication required by statute to be
determined on the record after an opportunity for an agency hearing.”164
While not the full protection of a trial, a “formal agency hearing” still has
strict requirements about notice, burden of proof, ex parte communications,
testimony and cross-examination, and the record established.165 Agencies
also frequently conduct informal hearings and while those proceedings are
unregulated directly by the Administrative Procedure Act,166 they are still
subject to the procedural due process protections of the federal
constitution.167 Informal hearings occur frequently and can invoke a variety
of potential processes to satisfy constitutional requirements.168
As the Supreme Court noted in Goss, while reifying a minimum of
procedures, “the interpretation and application of the Due Process Clause
[is an] intensely practical matter[] and that ‘[t]he very nature of due process
negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every
imaginable situation.’”169 How does an agency, or a hospital peer review
162. 397 U.S. at 268–69.
163. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (2014).
164. Id. § 554.
165. Id.
166. Although these adjudications are still subject to the ancillary requirements of
§ 555. CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURPHY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 2:33(2)(b) (2015).
167. Id.
168. WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 22:1–22:16 (3d ed. 2011)
(“These potential processes include: adequate notice, right to counsel, right to prompt
hearing and disposition, judicial hearings, right to present evidence, right to confrontation,
privilege against self-incrimination, right to an impartial tribunal, right to a jury, allocation
of burden of proof, and right to appeal.”). See generally Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of
Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (holding that merely informing the student and
making a careful and deliberate decision is sufficient procedure to satisfy due process);
Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d. 100 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding that assistance of counsel at
a university disciplinary hearing was required to satisfy due process when the student was
charged with a crime); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (holding that a neutral
decision maker, separate from the investigating committee, was not required to satisfy due
process when deciding whether to suspend a physician’s license to practice medicine).
169. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
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committee, determine where along the due process continuum is
appropriate in any given case? For constitutional due process, courts
almost uniformly use the rubric from Mathews v. Eldridge to determine
how much process is due.170
At issue in Mathews was whether Mr. Eldridge was entitled, under
the due process clause, to receive an evidentiary hearing before the
termination of his Social Security disability benefits.171 The Social Security
Act provided cash benefits to workers who were completely disabled.172
Mr. Eldridge began receiving benefits in 1968 but after a series of letters
the state agency made a final determination that his disability had ceased in
May of 1972 and he would no longer receive benefits.173
This
determination was accepted by the federal Social Security
Administration.174 Eldridge sued, relying on the logic of Goldberg v. Kelly,
that there was a due process right to an evidentiary hearing before
termination of benefits.175
After concluding that the due process clause did apply to his case,
the Court noted that it had “consistently . . . held that some form of hearing
is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest.”176
While, “[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” what process is
due in any given circumstance “generally requires a consideration of three
distinct factors.”177 These three factors include: first, the private interest
that will be affected by the action; second, the government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would require; and
third, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards.178
As Eldridge’s benefits were not based on financial need as the
welfare benefits were in Goldberg, the Court did not weigh his individual
interest to be overly strong, and the weight on the administration for full
evidentiary hearings was high.179 Moreover, disability benefits usually
turned upon “routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician
specialists” and “the potential value of an evidentiary hearing, or even oral
presentation to the decisionmaker is substantially less in this context than in
170. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 156, at § 17.8(i).
171. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 323–24.
174. Id. at 324.
175. Id. at 324–25.
176. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557–58
(1974)).
177. Id. at 333, 335 (citations omitted).
178. Id. at 335.
179. Id. at 340–41, 349.
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Goldberg.”180 Therefore, when weighing out the factors, Mr. Eldridge was
not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as a matter of constitutional,
procedural due process protections.181 However, the formula remains. The
way the factors are structured, particularly the third factor concerning the
value of a piece of process, requires the aggrieved party to identify a piece
of process that was missing in the underlying proceeding and argue for the
merits of its inclusion.
B.
The Appropriateness of Using Mathews v. Eldridge to Analyze
Statutory Due Process Required by the Healthcare Quality
Improvement Act
If a hospital is public and thus a state actor, then taking away a
doctor’s liberty interest in pursuing his or her profession or a property right
in his or her employment via an individualized decision making may trigger
the due process protections of the federal constitution.182 However, relying
on the use of “adequate notice and hearing” and even “fair under the
circumstances” combined with a robust legislative history and court
analysis, it is clear that HCQIA is trying to import a due process standard
into the peer review process. For analysis of procedural due process, the
statutory framework means that there is no need to consider whether or not
due process has been “triggered” as is done in a constitutional analysis of
what interests are being protected and who is acting and how they are
acting. Rather, in recognition of Congress’ intention for doctors to have
due process protections under the statute, the analysis may start with what
process is due. Once that obstacle is overcome, there is no reason to suffer
the application of § 11112(a)(3) without a rubric as to adequacy, as due

180. Id. at 344–45 (citations omitted).
181. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349.
182. See, e.g., Schueller v. Goddard, 631 F.3d 460, 462–63 (8th Cir. 2011) (“A
protected property interest exists where a plaintiff has a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ to a
benefit that is derived from a source such as state law” (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). “To survive summary judgment on [his] property interest procedural
due process claim, [Dr. Schueller] must provide evidence that [he] had a reasonable and
legitimate expectation of continued employment” (quoting Howard v. Columbia Pub. Sch.
Dist. 363 F.3d 797, 803 (8th Cir. 2004))); Ming Wei Liu v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 330
F. App’x 775, 780 (11th Cir. 2009) (“The Supreme Court has recognized that the liberty
component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause includes the right to pursue
a profession. . . . [However,] a claimant must present evidence suggesting that a
governmental act effectively banned him or her from a profession.”); Osuagwu v. Gila Reg’l
Med. Cen., 938 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1159 (D.N.M. 2012) (“Gila Regional supplied Plaintiff
with Bylaws that carefully restrict the termination or suspension of staff privileges and
provide specific procedures to be followed in disciplinary or suspension actions. He has,
therefore, established that he has a constitutionally-protected property right in his medical
privileges.”).
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process jurisprudence has already provided one in the form of Mathews v.
Eldridge.183
Without this kind of procedural protection, it is as if, “[p]rivate
hospitals, now largely supported by public moneys, [are not] required to
govern their staff by accepted 20th Century democratic standards.
Therefore, physicians . . . sacrifice[] their constitutional, civil, due process,
14th Amendment, and natural rights under peer review in private
hospitals.”184 Judicial interpretation of the statutory standard requiring
adequate notice and hearing procedures has completely abandoned any
desire to hold health care entities accountable to their bylaws, the safe
harbor provisions, or any rubric for a proper hearing. The peer review
process may be leveraged for abuse or induced for competitive reasons that
have nothing to do with the furtherance of quality patient care. There is
immunity for the process, but no oversight of the process itself.
Part of the problem with the application of the peer review process
is that it has been used to oust physicians for reasons other than
incompetence in the workplace. At times, the legal question has turned to
whether the termination at issue was actually based on physician
competence or rather based on other professional conduct or even private
conduct that might impact the care of patients. For example, the Third
Circuit in Gordon v. Lewistown Hospital extended HCQIA immunity to
conduct that did not have a direct impact on any patients but still took place
in a professional capacity.185 Gordon, the physician, questioned whether
the acts triggering the professional review action under HCQIA truly
adversely affected patients.186 Dr. Gordon was employing what he believed
to be a better surgical technique than another physician at the hospital.187
He ran ads in the newspaper advising potential patients to call the hospital
to get more information about the two procedures and eventually went so
far as to call the other physician’s patients to tell them disparaging
information about the other physician.188 The hospital initially only
suspended Dr. Gordon for forty-five days and conditioned his return on not
communicating with patients or others about the skills, competence, or
procedures of other physicians at the hospital.189 Dr. Gordon breached
these obligations by placing a phone call to at least one patient and mailing

183. This would also stem resistance to the usage of procedural due process
jurisprudence as a benchmark in cases that fall under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and HCQIA.
See, e.g., Osuagwu, 938 F. Supp. 2d at 1158 (The hospital argued before the court that
“because HCQIA immunity standards ‘are different’ from those establishing violation of
procedural due process rights, the Court’s . . . due process analysis ‘is not determinative.’”).
184. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 138 (statement of Dr. W. Michael Bird).
185. 423 F.3d 184, 206 (3d Cir. 2005).
186. Id. at 202.
187. Id. at 193.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 194.
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information to over thirty others about his technique, at which point the
hospital revoked his privileges.190
Dr. Gordon claimed that the hospital was not entitled to immunity
under HCQIA because his acts did not affect adversely the health or welfare
of patients as required for a professional review action.191 The Third
Circuit disagreed and determined that even though the physician’s act did
not directly threaten the health of the patients his acts harassed and
intimidated patients.192 The court heavily relied on the language of the
statute, more specifically “could” and “welfare.”193 The court determined
that these terms allow for the inclusion of any conduct that might affect a
patient’s well-being in any capacity.194 This is a common interpretation
among the different circuits.195 Courts have determined that any narrower
interpretation would be counter to the congressional intent behind
HCQIA.196 As is common in agency interpretations of mandates, a court
will refuse to substitute its own judgment with that of the hospital’s as to
whether the actions could adversely affect a patient.197
Pretext in the peer review process for outside conduct may extend
to other areas as well. When testifying before the Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the Committee of the Judiciary, Dr. W.
Michael Byrd contended:
The hospital staff disciplinary process in this country is a
national disgrace at the present time. Physicians are
maliciously being deprived of their rights to practice
medicine based on race, economics, social class, ethnicity
and even their political views. This new climate of
intolerance has permeated the peer review process to such
an extent that often these proceedings have little to do with
the quality of medicine offered the patient.198
Additionally, before the House of Representatives, the lack of protection
under the statute was specifically attacked, and Congressman Edwards
190. Gordon, 423 F.3d at 196–97.
191. Id. at 202.
192. Id. at 203.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 203–04 (emphasis added).
195. Gordon, 423 F.3d at 203–04 (citing Meyers v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.,
341 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2003); Brader v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 167 F.3d 832, 835 (3d Cir.
1999); Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg’l Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 1994);
Imperial v. Suburban Hosp. Ass’n, 37 F.3d 1026 (4th Cir. 1994); Morgan v. PeaceHealth,
Inc., 14 P.3d 773, 782 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000)).
196. Id. at 203 (“[C]ompetence and professional conduct should be interpreted in a way
that is sufficiently broad to protect legitimate actions based on matters that raise concerns for
patients or patient care.” (quoting 132 CONG. REC. 30,768 (1986)).
197. Id. at 204.
198. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 2, at 137.
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noted, “[u]nder the scheme established by this proposed legislation,
competent doctors, with limited financial resources, whose rights have been
violated by illegal peer review actions will be driven from medical practice
with no hope of redress from existing Federal and State laws which provide
protections from such illegal acts.”199 His argument was that there were
simply not enough protections under the bill and that “the fundamental flaw
of the bill in its present form continues to be that the immunities shield
professional actions which are fair as well as actions which are illegal.”200
There are some specific procedural protections that may be of use
in particular circumstances to physicians. With a Mathews v. Eldridge
rubric a court could ask what is “fair under the circumstances” when the
safe harbor provisions are not met, and determine whether another
procedure is needed to ensure this fairness. As the legislative history points
out:
[the statute] does not mandate access to all medical records
and documents that may be used by the peer review
committee. Since a physician subject to peer review is, in a
real sense, in jeopardy of losing his professional standing,
it is essential that he have available all pertinent documents
and other written evidence relevant to the proceedings in
order to rebut the charges.201
Of course, these requirements are all the more important when “a
presumption of validity attaches to peer review actions, as the [statute] also
provides.”202 Mathews provides for a weighing mechanism, a way to
achieve the balance desired by Congress, between the resources and
administrative and financial needs of the hospital or medical review panel
and the individual interest of the physician at issue in the case.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Mathews v. Eldridge analysis requires that a court evaluate each
requested piece of process to see whether it is required in a given instance.
This analysis does not mandate any particular kind of formal proceeding
but looks, as the statute here requires, to see what is “adequate” or “fair
under the circumstances.”203 When evaluating competing interests in a peer
review proceeding, it is clear to see with a Mathews framework that a
physician’s interest is strong. Even without reverting to the constitutional
analysis requirement of a liberty or property interest, a doctor has invested
199. 132 CONG REC. 30,769 (1986).
200. Id.
201. 132 CONG REC. 30,773 (1986) (statement of Rep. Peter Rodino).
202. Id.
203. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)(3) (2013).
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an enormous amount of time and money into his or her education and
career.204 With the reporting system in place, a bad outcome from a peer
review proceeding could easily cost a physician his or her career in every
state. A hospital’s interest could also be strong in furthering patient care
and protecting patients from incompetent or unprofessional doctors.
However, in order to test whether or not the health care entity actually has
such an interest in the proceeding and is not using the proceeding as a mere
pretext would aid the analysis. If pretext is found, that would weigh against
the hospital. The cost, both of time and expense, of any additional
procedures would also fall under this side of the interest analysis as a court
seeks to balance the interests of the physician and the hospital.
However, perhaps the most important part of the rubric is the
investigation of whether a certain piece of process is required. For example,
the safe harbor provisions provide that a physician may be represented in
the hearing by an attorney or other person of the physician’s choice.205
Rather than looking at that as a mandate or something to be ignored
entirely, a court should inquire, given the competing interests in this case,
does the addition of representation add something to the proceeding? Does
it reduce the possibility of error in a manner that is worth the cost of
requiring the procedure in this instance? This is a fact intensive case by
case determination. Certainly this asks more of a court than refusing to
analyze the problem of procedure all together or sweeping it under a rug of
opaque “reasonableness,” but it satisfies the will of Congress with regard to
the statute. Moreover, there is a body of jurisprudence in the area of
constitutional procedural due process to apply Mathews v. Eldridge and to
see when and why certain pieces of process are appropriate or required.206
Currently the scale is not set to balance interests but is weighted
presumptively, again and again and in a myriad of ways, in favor of the
health care entity in ways that may not improve the quality of health care
for patients. This is an inexcusable interpretation of the statute given the
accessibility of a procedural due process framework that does provide a
204. See “How Do I . . . Pay for Medical School?”, ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS.,
https://www.aamc.org/students/aspiring/paying/283080/pay-med-school.html (last visited
Mar. 25, 2014) (stating that the median debt for a graduating medical student was
approximately $175,000 in 2013). This figure does not include further training and
specialization necessary for gainful employment.
205. § 11112(b)(3)(C)(i).
206. See, e.g., Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1325–26
(2012) (“Mathews had an impact far beyond the narrow question presented in that case.
According to the Supreme Court, Mathews offers ‘a general approach’ for testing
challenged procedures under a due process claim. The Court has
subsequently applied Mathews’s three-factor analysis in a variety of contexts unrelated to
public benefits terminations, including terminations of parental rights, involuntary civil
commitments to mental hospitals, civil forfeitures, detention of citizens as enemy
combatants, immigration deportation proceedings, and terminations of public employment.
The Court has even used the Mathews balancing approach to analyze claims under the
Constitution’s Suspension Clause.”) (citations omitted).
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rubric for adequate notice and hearing procedures and a weighing
mechanism for these important competing interests.
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